Calvin Mouw 
The historic votes are in. On October 20, 2024 the EU referendum vote in Moldova passed by the exceptionally thin margin of 50.35% to 49.65%. On November 3, 2024, Maia Sandu won reelection to the presidency, defeating Aleksandr Stoianoglo in the runoff by a margin of 55.35% to 44.67%.
Both of these are of great importance for the future of Moldova, its planned marriage with the EU, and the EU itself. The EU vote result means the government can amend the constitution and continue the negotiation process for ascension. Sandu would like a 2030 deadline to become a member country. Both sides are well-motivated to get this done, but maintaining momentum is key. Several things could slow this down, both in Moldova and the EU.
Factors in Moldova
This was a massive win for Maia Sandu, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), and the prospects for Moldova in the EU.
But there are some things that could slow down the momentum, however.
We must remember that Sandu is President, and Article 77 of the Constitution doesn’t give her a whole lot of institutional power (she is just Head of State). Expectations are extremely high, and the pressure is now on the PAS and Dorin Recean, the Prime Minister and Sandu ally, to produce. Sandu has said it herself: “We must speed up the implementation of reforms and consolidate our democracy.”
The current seating in parliament has PAS holding 62 of the 101 seats with the Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BCS) at 26. They need to act now as parliamentary elections are due in 2025. The EU has given them constant support and assistance, and they can’t screw this up. They have a lot to do.
The must continue the move to reach equivalence (Acquis) with the EU on legal, administrative, and financial procedures.
They must attain greater energy independence and security.
They must reduce corruption.
They have to work on strengthening the defense sector.
It is imperative that they speed up economic development.
They still have to deal with the breakaway state of Transnistria and the Russian military presence. Russian influence in general is a serious problem.
They need to do all this for their own electoral prospects in 2025; and they need to impress the leaders in Brussels who want to see if Moldova is up to this.
Factors In Brussels
There are moving parts here as well, but the commitment to Moldova is a centerpiece to the EU geopolitical strategy. None of what is happening here carries the weight of the potential instability and uncertainty inside Moldova.
The EU is just beginning the second von der Leyen Commission (2024-2029). During her first term, she focused on helping Ukraine and their fight against Russia and she will stick with the same strategy in her second term. There is a strong anti-Putin trio of females running the show with von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas as foreign affairs chief and Roberta Metsola as European Parliament chief. Von der Leyen has stated that enlargement will remain a “core priority.”
Right now, the EU’s unity and political will is at a high point, but geopolitics is not the only active dimension, and it could be challenged. Political uncertainty in the EU is defined by the electoral prospects of the right-wing populists. They made significant gains in the 2024 parliamentary elections, but the informal coalition process has left them on the outside looking as von der Leyen’s European People’s Party just committed to work together with the Socialists and Democrats and liberal Renew for the next five years. Support for Moldova and a strong anti-Putin sentiment will remain intact for that period of time.
Changing the Rules of the Game
Unity on enlargement has come with a demand for serious structural reform from France and Germany. A report in September of 2024 by twelve French and German experts calls for “tighter rules on rule of law, new voting procedures in the European Council, and a bigger EU budget.” It also calls for a “phased integration” process in the areas of energy, the single market and security, and defense; and a system of sanctions to keep the “lesser members” in check.
The objectives are pretty clear. France and Germany want a decision-making process run by a small coalition of the willing that share their ideas of what the EU should be and do. This isn’t going to happen. While we may see some changes at the margins; the common good will continue to take a back seat to self-interest. Member countries like Hungary will continue to tie the hands of the EU on matters like support for Ukraine.
A Trump Presidency
Little good will come from a Trump presidency. The best spin is to hope that in the long-term, Europe may be forced to reassess itself and figure out how to better stand on its own in the world. That will take cooperation and unity; because if the EU acts as a collective, they are a strong player in the world. There are a lot of things the Trump administration can do to keep that from happening.
First and foremost is trade policy, a wonderful tool of division; and oneTrump has this high on his list. Sylvie Matelly, head of the Institut Jacques Delors thinks it “could be the first victim of the new president’s election.” Trump has talked about introducing a universal tariff of 10-20 percent; with a 60 percent tariff on goods from China. US tariffs would contract the market for foreign products, and with the bulk of EU countries already over-manufacturing, economic outputs will be severely dampened. Trade oriented economies will be hit worse than the other economies and Matelly, like just about everyone else, is not optimistic Europeans will remain united against Trump. Collective retaliation will be necessary; but when it comes to trade and the free movement of goods and services, the EU is just a patchwork of 27 separate systems.The two heavyweights, France and Germany, are already struggling; and getting them on board may be difficult, The Moldova Growth Plan proposes immediate access to the EU’s single market and all the intended benefits; it remains to be seen what the extent of those benefits will be.
The only certainty about Trump is that we know he plays favorites. He sees loyalty in Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni; and he will do whatever he can to help the populist forces and parties in Czechia, Slovakia, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. It will be interesting to see if Moldova joins this list.
